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Consumer search is not only costly but also tiring. We characterize the intertemporal effects that search
fatigue has on oligopoly prices, product proliferation, and the provision of consumer assistance (i.e.,
advice). These effects vary based on whether search is all-or-nothing or sequential in nature, whether
learning takes place, and whether consumers exhibit brand loyalty. We perform welfare analysis and
highlight the novel empirical implications that our analysis generates.
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It is now well-accepted in economics that search is costly, unless you are lucky enough to be a
 -type (i.e., a shopper or an expert with zero search costs). Search may take place sequentially
(e.g., Lippman and McCall, 1976; Reinganum, 1979; Stahl, 1989; Stahl, 1996), by examining a
ﬁxed sample of options (e.g., MacMinn, 1980), or via an all-or-nothing approach (e.g., Salop and
Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980). Producer and consumer behavior in these settings have been widely
studied, and equilibria typically share two standard features: price dispersion and heterogeneous
sophistication. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) provide a thorough review of this literature.1
The fact that search is tiring (and can aﬀect future behavior) has been overlooked. Fatigue from
searching in one period may aﬀect the costs and incentives to become informed in future periods. In
this paper, we characterize oligopoly behavior cognizant of consumers’ tendency to become fatigued
from search. In contrast to standard search models, accounting for fatigue leads to time-varying
prices and consumer assistance (i.e., advice) as well as product proliferation. We also explore how
learning, brand loyalty and the type of search that occurs impacts oligopoly outcomes.
In our setting, ﬁrms oﬀer products for sale over an inﬁnite horizon. In each period, every ﬁrm
oﬀers one product of ﬁxed value and has discretion to oﬀer other products with zero value. Prices,
consumer assistance, and the length of the product line are set competitively and optimally. We
begin by considering a single consumer who purchases one item in each period from one of the ﬁrms
and rationally chooses whether to search for the best alternative, taking into account the impact
that fatigue from search has on future behavior. We consider three types of search: all-or-nothing
search, sequential search in which the consumer incurs a cost for each additional ﬁrm she visits,
and sequential search in which the consumer pays a ﬁxed cost to have the freedom to sort products
systematically.
This initial analysis yields the following ﬁndings. Whereas a monopolist always chooses to
produce only the valuable product, ﬁrms competing in an oligopoly usually engage in socially
wasteful product proliferation. But the amount of product proliferation that occurs depends on the
1See also Diamond (1971), Stiglitz (1979), Weitzman (1979) Braverman (1980), Braverman and Dixit (1981),
Salop and Stiglitz (1982), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), and Rob (1985).
1search technology. When search is sequential and the consumer incurs an incremental cost per ﬁrm
she visits, the equilibrium mimics that of Diamond (1971) in which no search occurs and there is no
product proliferation. This is not surprising because all ﬁrms enjoy local monopoly power. However,
when all-or-nothing search is used or when the consumer pays a ﬁxed cost for the freedom to search
sequentially, product proliferation arises. Interestingly, in the all-or-nothing search setting, the
average amount of product proliferation for each ﬁrm is monotonically decreasing in the number of
ﬁrms. In contrast in the ﬁxed cost sequential search setting, ﬁrms maximally expand their product
lines in a uniform way, independent of the number of ﬁrms in the market. We show that this is the
most severe form of product proliferation.
When there is a monopolist or search occurs with incremental costs, prices do not vary across
time and are set at monopoly levels. However, when all-or-nothing search or ﬁxed cost sequential
search occurs, time-varying prices and consumer assistance arise. In those periods when consumers
are fatigued, prices evolve at monopoly levels and consumer assistance is highest. During periods
of search, prices are lower, but no consumer assistance is oﬀered.
We then extend our model to include consumer learning and to allow ﬁrms to alter their product
lines dynamically. In this extension, we show that product proliferation is time-varying because
the ﬁrms extend their product lines during search and only oﬀer the product of ﬁxed value when
search does not take place. In this setting, providing assistance is a dominated strategy because
the ﬁrm could instead lower the number of extraneous products that they oﬀer and save the cost
of production. Also, since learning takes place over time, which is modeled as a time-varying cost
function, product proliferation becomes more severe as time progresses. Intuitively, the ﬁrms need
to increase their product lines to assure that the consumer continues to require rest intermittently.
This implies that redundant product proliferation and industry maturity are positively correlated.
Finally, we conclude our analysis by considering that a mass of consumers search for the best
alternative. At any time, there is a fraction of rested consumers and a group that is fatigued
from previous search. The equilibrium that we derive exhibits features that are similar to the
one consumer case: time-varying prices and consumer assistance. Several additional ﬁndings arise.
First, the ﬁrms play a mixed strategy in prices that is time varying depending on the fraction of
2fatigued consumers. The distribution is similar to that in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), except
that it varies period to period. Also, like Rosenthal (1980), the distribution of prices depends on
the number of ﬁrms: the stronger the degree of competition the more likely it is that ﬁrms choose
to set higher prices. Finally, brand loyalty does not cause our results about time-varying price
distributions and consumer assistance to disappear. Rather, brand loyalty aﬀects the distribution
that the ﬁrms choose in equilibrium. When there is less loyalty, the ﬁrms compete more vigorously
in the market, which causes the lower bound on the price distribution to decrease, but leads ﬁrms
to place more probability weight on higher prices.
The results in this paper apply to markets in which consumers search intermittently and repeat-
edly for the best alternative: money management, travel, shipping services, loans and credit terms,
to name a few. It also applies to industries that share consumers (e.g., banking and insurance) who
search intermittently for related products. To our knowledge, the empirical implications that we
highlight throughout the paper are new to the search literature. Testing them empirically is the
subject of future research.
Our paper adds to a growing literature in which ﬁrms can make search more diﬃcult, either
via obfuscation (Spiegler, 2006; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2011; Carlin and Manso, 2011), complexity
(Carlin, 2009), or shrouding attributes (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). In contrast, to previous studies,
we endogenize both the consumer’s search choice and the ﬁrms strategic decisions in a dynamic
framework. Additionally, we consider issues such as consumer assistance, product proliferation,
and brand loyalty, which are all new considerations in this literature.
To ease the reader’s search for our salient ideas and to prevent fatigue, we provide the following
outline for the paper. In Section 2, we describe the setup of our model of search fatigue. Section 3
analyzes monopoly and oligopoly behavior in several search settings. Section 4 explores time-
varying product proliferation and learning. Section 5 reconsiders our analysis with a continuum of
consumers and heterogeneous fatigue. We also analyze the eﬀect that brand loyalty has on search
fatigue and oligopoly behavior. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in Appendix A. Some
other model variations are explored in Appendix B.
32 The Model
Consider a market in which n ﬁrms, indexed by j ∈ N = {1,...,n}, oﬀer a line of goods to a single
consumer over an inﬁnite horizon. Time evolves in discrete periods indexed by t ∈ {1,...,∞}, and
utility (i.e., proﬁts or consumer surplus) is discounted by δ = 1
1+r per period. Each ﬁrm makes
three strategic choices during the game: the length of its product line, prices for all of its products,
and how much assistance to oﬀer the consumer when she visits its store. The timing of the game
is described below and is depicted in Figure 1.
The length of each ﬁrm’s product line is denoted by ℓj and L ≡
Pn
j=1 ℓj. Each product line
must contain a single product of ﬁxed value ¯ q. We refer to this as the special product. Each ﬁrm
has discretion to oﬀer additional products of zero value and incurs an initial cost of κ for each
additional product it adds. As such, the average quality of each ﬁrm’s products is
¯ q
ℓj. In our
analysis, we start by considering the case in which the product line decision occurs once at the
beginning of time. Subsequently, in Section 4 we analyze the case in which ﬁrms can alter their
product lines in each period t.
In each period, every ﬁrm chooses prices for each of its products. Let p1
j denote the price of
ﬁrm j’s special product and denote the other prices by pm
j , where m ∈ {2,...,ℓj}.
The consumer purchases one product in each period and chooses whether to search for the best
alternative. Search may be all-or-nothing or sequential in nature. We analyze both of these cases
and compare the equilibrium outcomes. Before making a search decision, the consumer observes
how many ﬁrms are in the market and how many total products are oﬀered. In period t, the
consumer’s search cost is c(xt−1), where xt−1 is the number of products she examined in the prior
period. We assume that x0 = 0, that c( ) is increasing in its argument, and that c(∞) = ∞.
Therefore, when the consumer chooses whether to search, she has to take into account the eﬀect
her decision has on her choice next period as well as the resulting ﬁrm behavior. To make the
analysis economically meaningful, we assume that 0 < c(0) < ¯ q.
If the consumer chooses not to search, she is randomly allocated to one of the L products in













Figure 1: Search fatigue game. At the beginning of the game, each ﬁrm chooses the length of its
product line. Then, in each period t ∈ {1,2,...}, the choices of the consumer and ﬁrms take place
according to this timeline. First, at τ = 1, the consumer decides whether she wants to search.
At τ = 2, the ﬁrms choose their prices. At τ = 3, when the consumer visits a particular ﬁrm, it
chooses whether to provide consumer assistance or not. Finally, at τ = 4, the consumer chooses
whether to proceed with her purchase or walk away.
whether or not buy this randomly chosen product at the price oﬀered by the ﬁrm.2
Deﬁne Jt as the number of stores that a consumer visits in period t. When a consumer visits a
ﬁrm’s store and there are multiple products to choose from, the ﬁrm may oﬀer assistance aj ∈ {0,1}
at no cost. When aj = 1, the consumer is directed to the special product, even if the consumer
was randomly allocated to another product oﬀered by the ﬁrm. In this case, the consumer saves on
the search costs incurred at that store. When a ﬁrm chooses aj = 0, the consumer is left to make
choices on her own without assistance and without a decrease in future search costs. As such, the
eﬀective xt with advice may be computed as




The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the game t = 0, each ﬁrm chooses ℓj.
Then, each period t ∈ {1,2,...}, is divided into four parts. At τ = 1, the consumer ﬁrst observes
how many ﬁrms and products are in the market and decides whether to search. Then, at τ = 2
the ﬁrms set prices for each of their products. At τ = 3, if the consumer visits ﬁrm j’s store, it
chooses whether to oﬀer consumer assistance. Finally, at τ = 4, the consumer makes her purchase
decision. The consumer makes a purchase only if her utility is weakly greater than walking away.
2As will soon become apparent, if we pose an alternative model with inertia, our results are unchanged. Speciﬁcally,
if the consumer remains with the same ﬁrm when she does not search, our results on product proliferations, time-
varying prices, and consumer assistance remain. See Remark 3.
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n] lists the product line choices that the ﬁrms choose at t = 0. The vectors F∗
t (p)
and a∗
t are the time-varying equilibrium pricing and advice strategies that the ﬁrms use. As we will
show shortly, in the one consumer case, pricing entails pure strategies, whereas with heterogeneous
fatigue (i.e., Section 5), the ﬁrms utilize mixed strategies. Finally, s∗
t is the time-varying search
decision by the consumer.
Going forward, we make the assumption that
κ <
δ¯ q
n2(¯ L − 1)
. (2)
This condition is suﬃcient to assure participation of each of the ﬁrms. It simpliﬁes the analysis
because it allows us to abstract away from the coordination problems that arise in joint production
problems. Indeed, it assures that the initial cost of adding products is not too high, and that all
ﬁrms consider producing extra products.
3.1 Monopoly
We begin by analyzing the case where n = 1, which will serve as a benchmark of comparison to
the oligopoly case.
Suppose the consumer chose to search in the current period t. In that case she selects the
product that yields the highest utility. Given that the monopolist can extract all the surplus from
the transaction, he sets prices to make the consumer indiﬀerent between buying the special product
and walking away. The equilibrium price for special product is p1 = ¯ q while all other prices are
pj > 0 for j  = 1. The monopolist chooses a = 0 and its per period proﬁts are equal to ¯ q. The
consumer earns zero utility from purchasing the special product and she incurs the cost of search.
Now suppose the consumer does not search in period t. The monopolist can choose a = 1 and
direct her toward the special product. In this case, the monopolist’s per period proﬁts are ¯ q. The
consumer again earns zero utility from purchasing the special product, but she does not incur the
cost of search.
6The consumer receives a surplus of −c(ℓ) per period when she searches and 0 when she does
not search. Hence, for any ℓ the consumer never searches. As a result, the monopolist maximizes
proﬁts by producing only one product, namely the special product, ℓ = 1.
The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 1. (Monopoly) Suppose that a ﬁrm is a monopolist in the market (n = 1). The
equilibrium outcome vector (ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t,s∗
t) is such that the monopolist produces one product,
ℓ∗ = 1, p1,∗ = ¯ q for all t, no search takes place, s∗
t = 0, and no assistance is given, a∗
t = 0.





Before moving to the analysis of oligopoly competition, it is important to note a few straight-
forward observations. First, there is no product proliferation in the monopoly case. Since the
monopolist collects all of the rents from production, there is no reason to oﬀer suboptimal prod-
ucts. Second, there is no consumer search; since there is only one ﬁrm and one valuable product,
no eﬀort is wasted on search and there is no fatigue. Thus, the monopoly case is most eﬃcient from
a welfare standpoint. Since prices are merely transfers, zero costs are expended on extra product
proliferation and sorting products. This eﬃciency is not retained in the oligopoly setting.
3.2 Oligopoly
In what follows, we consider the two types of search in turn. In both cases we solve by backward
induction period by period.
3.2.1 All-or-Nothing Search
In this search setting, if the consumer elects to search in period t she pays c(xt−1), and she becomes
completely informed about the products and prices oﬀered by every ﬁrm in period t. Recall that
xt−1 is the number of products that she examined in the prior period without assistance, x0 = 0,
c( ) is increasing in its argument, 0 < c(0) < ¯ q, and c(∞) = ∞.
Let us ﬁrst suppose that the consumer chooses to search and that a total of L products and n
special products are oﬀered in the market. Given that the consumer searches, the ﬁrms set prices
7such that pj = 0 for all products due to Bertrand competition. The consumer selects one of the
special products from one of the n ﬁrms and earns a surplus of ¯ q −c(xt−1), while all the ﬁrms earn
zero proﬁts. It is important to note that there is no inherent beneﬁt for the manager at any of the
ﬁrms to provide consumer assistance.
Now, suppose that the consumer does not search. It is straightforward to show that each ﬁrm
sets prices p1
j = ¯ q for all j and, to ensure that the special product is always purchased, pm
j > 0 for
all j and m  = 1. Further, it is clear that if the consumer arrives at ﬁrm j, it is optimal for the
manager to choose aj = 1 so that the consumer correctly identiﬁes the special product. Otherwise,
the consumer might try to purchase a suboptimal product m > 1 yielding the ﬁrm zero proﬁt.
With assistance, the consumer purchases the special product and earns zero surplus, but the ﬁrm
earns proﬁts equal to ¯ q.
Given this purchase behavior the ﬁrms all strictly prefer that the consumer does not search as
they earn zero proﬁts when search occurs and they have a positive expected proﬁt
¯ q
n in each period
when no search occurs. Given that c(0) < ¯ q, the consumer is always willing to search in the current
period if she did not search in the previous period. However, if the consumer is suﬃciently fatigued,
she will not search and this preserves rents for the ﬁrms in the market. In the context of our model,
the consumer is willing to search if and only if ¯ q > c(L) and rests otherwise. Hence, because c( ) is
monotonically increasing, there exists a unique threshold ¯ L above which the consumer is unwilling
to search in the current period if she searched in the previous period without assistance. More
formally, ¯ L is the smallest integer such that ¯ q ≤ c(¯ L).
Proposition 2. (All-or-Nothing Search) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic all-or-nothing
search setting and that (2) is satisﬁed. The equilibrium outcome tuple (ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t,s∗
t) is such that
L∗ = ¯ L and
(i) In all odd number periods (t = 1,t = 3,...), the consumer searches, s∗ = 1, a∗
j = 0 for all j,
and p
m,∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ N,m ∈ ℓj.
(ii) In all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...), no consumer search occurs, s∗ = 0, aj = 1 for
all j, p
1,∗
j = ¯ q for all j, and p
m,∗
j > 0 for all j ∈ N,m ∈ ℓj such that m > 1.






j − 1)κ, (4)
and the consumer’s expected discounted surplus is
U∗ =
1
1 − δ2 ¯ q. (5)
According to Proposition 2, search, prices, and consumer assistance are time-varying. The ﬁrms
have an incentive to produce enough products to ensure that a consumer who searches becomes
fatigued. By construction, the consumer searches in the ﬁrst period because her search cost is c(0)
and she stands to gain ¯ q. However, because L∗ = ¯ L, her second period search cost c(¯ L) is greater
than ¯ q whence it is optimal for her to rest during the second period. In this case, the ﬁrm that she
goes to has monopoly power and directs her to the special product.
None of the ﬁrms have a unilateral incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. First, no ﬁrm
has a reason to give a searching consumer any assistance. If one ﬁrm did so, then the consumer
would not get as tired during search and would search again in the subsequent period: because
c(¯ L−1) < ¯ q, assistance would decrease the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts from
¯ q
n to zero. Therefore, no ﬁrm
will oﬀer the consumer assistance when she is actively searching. In contrast, when the consumer is
not searching and is randomly paired with a particular ﬁrm, that ﬁrm will oﬀer assistance to direct
the consumer to the special product that yields revenue ¯ q > 0. Much like the monopoly case, the
ﬁrm has a strong incentive to assure that the consumer ignores products that have no value for the
consumer.
Second, no ﬁrm has a reason to change its product line unilaterally, given the behavior of the
other ﬁrms. Suppose L = ¯ L. If a particular ﬁrm j deviates and produces more products than ℓ∗
j,
it incurs an extra cost of κ per additional product, but it does not change its expected revenues:
this is not a proﬁtable deviation. Suppose that the ﬁrm deviates and produces any fewer products
than ℓ∗
j. The best possible deviation would be to produce only the special product and to avoid
paying (ℓ∗
j − 1)κ. In this case, the expected proﬁt drops from
¯ q
n to zero. But because (2) holds,
this is never a proﬁtable deviation.
9It is also straightforward to show that while ¯ L is unique, a unique equilibrium does not exist.
For example, suppose n = 4 and ¯ L = 9. There are many permutations in which the ﬁrms can
produce that will constitute an equilibrium. As long as ¯ L products are produced by all the ﬁrms
in the market, there is no reason for any one ﬁrm to deviate.
3.2.2 Sequential Search
We now consider two types of sequential search, one in which the consumer pays an incremental
cost for each additional ﬁrm that she visits and one with a ﬁxed cost that the consumer pays
to search ﬁrms sequentially. In both cases when the consumer searches a ﬁrm, she examines all
products at the ﬁrm.
Incremental cost of search Suppose in each period that the consumer is randomly paired with
a ﬁrm and then pays c(xt−1) for each additional ﬁrm she visits. As before, xt−1 is the number
of products that the consumer examined in the prior period without assistance, and the previous
assumptions regarding the search cost continue to hold.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 3. (Incremental Sequential Search) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic in-
cremental sequential search. Then, no search takes place, ℓ∗
j = 1 for all j, no assistance is needed,
p1





The result in Proposition 3 mimics that in Diamond (1971). Since the consumer faces a ﬁxed
but positive search cost, the equilibrium involves uniform monopoly pricing. The consumer has
no incentive to pay a cost to search since all products and prices are the same. Given that the
consumer does not search, the ﬁrms have no incentive to add superﬂuous products to their lines.
The equilibrium is similar to that in Proposition 1, which is not surprising: the incremental search
costs endows each ﬁrm with local monopoly power so that there is no incentive for socially wasteful
product proliferation.
10Fixed cost of sequential search Suppose at the beginning of each period, the consumer chooses
whether to pay c(xt−1). If she does so, she can search sequentially with no incremental cost for
doing so. If not, she is randomly paired with one ﬁrm as in the all-or-nothing search setting. As
before xt−1 is still the number of products that the consumer examined in the prior period without
assistance, and the previous assumptions regarding the search cost continue to hold.
Proposition 4. (Fixed Cost Sequential Search) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic ﬁxed
cost sequential search game. Suppose that (2) holds. Then, there exists an equilibrium ℓ∗
j = ¯ L for
all j such that
(i) In all odd number periods (t = 1,t = 3,...), the consumer searches, a∗
j = 0 for all j, and
p
m,∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ N,m ∈ ℓj.
(ii) In all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...), no consumer search occurs, aj = 1 for all j,
p
1,∗
j = ¯ q for all j, and p
m,∗
j > 0 for all j ∈ N,m ∈ ℓj such that m > 1.





− (¯ L − 1)kp, (7)
and the consumer’s expected discounted surplus is
U∗ =
1
1 − δ2 ¯ q. (8)
The proof and intuition of Proposition 4 follows the same logic as Proposition 2, except that
it leads to more severe product proliferation. Since the pricing during periods of search yields
a Bertrand paradox, the consumer only visits one ﬁrm. In this case, each ﬁrm must produce ¯ L
products to induce suﬃcient fatigue so that the consumer rests intermittently. Compared to the
all-or-nothing search setting in which there are ¯ L products in the market, n¯ L products are made
available when sequential search is used. This maximizes socially wasteful product proliferation
and leads to a drop in welfare.
Remark 1. Fixed-sample search in which the consumer compares the products from k ﬁrms may
also be analyzed in the same fashion (e.g., MacMinn, 1980). For any
¯ L
k that is integer valued, the
11case in which ℓ∗
j =
¯ L
k leads to equilibrium that is qualitatively similar to that in Propositions 2 and 4.
The condition in (2) is suﬃcient and the degree of product proliferation Lk is monotonically de-
creasing in k such that ¯ L < Lk < n¯ L.3
Remark 2. It is straightforward to show that the same results would hold with a unit mass of
identical consumers who all begin the game with x0 = 0 (i.e., they are initially rested). We will
show this to be the case in the Section 5 when we consider heterogenous fatigue.
Remark 3. Our assumption about the random choice of product whenever the consumer does not
search can also be relaxed. It is straightforward to show that if instead of random choice, a consumer
who does not search in period t is allocated to the same product that she purchased in period t − 1,
all of our results still hold. If the consumer purchases the same product again when she does not
search, the price is equal to ¯ q.
4 Time-Varying Product Proliferation and Learning
So far, we have restricted ﬁrms to make their product line choices once and not adapt to consumer
search. In this section, we build on our all-or-nothing search framework to relax that assumption.
Additionally, we have assumed that the consumer does not learn from period to period. Implicitly,
we have restricted our analysis to a consumer that already has expertise in buying the products
under study. In what follows, we reconsider this assumption and allow the consumer to learn as
time evolves.
Consider the setup in Section 2 with two modiﬁcations. First, let us suppose that each ﬁrm
chooses ℓj,t at the beginning of each period t ∈ {1,...,∞}. The cost of producing non-valuable
products is still κ, but this cost is incurred in each period the extra products are oﬀered. The
timing for the game is portrayed in Figure 2.
Second, let us suppose that the consumer’s cost function is time-varying. Speciﬁcally, assume
that ct(z) > ct+1(z) for all t and any z. This captures the idea that during each period, the
consumer learns at least something new about the market under study. However, we make no
assumption regarding the importance of what she learns.
















Figure 2: Search fatigue game with time-varying product lines. In each period t ∈ {1,2,...}, the
choices of the consumer and ﬁrms take place according to this timeline. At τ = 1, each ﬁrm chooses
the length of its product line. Then, at τ = 2, the consumer decides whether she wants to search.
At τ = 3, the ﬁrms choose their prices. At τ = 4, when the consumer visits a particular ﬁrm, it
chooses whether to provide consumer assistance or not. Finally, at τ = 5, the consumer chooses
whether to proceed with her purchase or walk away.
Given these assumptions the threshold ¯ L to induce intermittent search behavior by the consumer
will be time-varying. We denote this dependence by ¯ Lt and specify ¯ Lt as the smallest integer such
that ¯ q ≤ ct(¯ Lt).
Proposition 5. (Recurring product line choices and learning) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a
dynamic all-or-nothing search setting and that at every time t
κ <
δ¯ q
n2(¯ Lt − 1)
. (9)
Then, there exists an equilibrium tuple (ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t,s∗
t) such that L∗
t = ¯ Lt and
(i) In all odd number periods (t = 1,t = 3,...), the consumer searches, s∗ = 1, aj = 0 for all j,
and p
m,∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ N,m ∈ ℓj.
(ii) In all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...), no consumer search occurs, s∗ = 0, a∗
j = 0 for
all j, ℓ∗
j = 1 for all j, and p
1,∗
j = ¯ q for all j.
The results in Proposition 5 contrast with those in Proposition 2 in three ways. First, prod-
uct proliferation is time-varying. In periods in which the consumer searches, the ﬁrms produce
enough products to tire her out. However, during periods in which she rests, no product prolif-
eration takes place. Second, consumer assistance is a superﬂuous consideration. That is, it is a
dominated strategy for any ﬁrm to produce extra products during even number periods and grant
assistance. Instead, it is optimal for them to only produce the special product and save on the
13costs of proliferation. Third, Proposition 5 and the construction of our model implies that aggre-
gate product proliferation will increase in time as the consumer becomes more experienced. This
implies that empirically we should observe more redundant product proliferation in markets that
are more seasoned.
The condition in (9) is related to that in (2) except that ¯ L is time-varying and increasing.
However, it is important to point out that we are also implicitly assuming that the consumer’s cost
function doesn’t get too small as time went on. If it did so that κ >
δ¯ q
n2(¯ Lt−1) , then there would
exist a critical time after which search would occur in every period. That is, for a ﬁnite time, prices
and product proliferation would vary with time. After that, product proliferation would stop and
prices would evolve at Bertrand prices.
5 Aggregate Time-Varying Fatigue
In this section, we extend our analysis to consider time-varying fatigue in which a fraction of
consumers begins the game rested and the remainder is too fatigued to search in the initial period.
We derive an equilibrium with a time-varying distribution of prices, product proliferation, and
consumer assistance. Following that, we explore the additional consideration of brand loyalty.
Indeed, some consumers may have switching costs or inertia, and we analyze how this aﬀects our
analysis.
5.1 Heterogeneous Fatigue
Consider an all-or-nothing search environment in which  t is the fraction of consumers who choose
to search in any period t and 1 −  t is the fraction who is randomly paired with a ﬁrm. The setup
is otherwise unchanged from Section 2. The ﬁrms initially choose ℓj and then the timing proceeds
according to the timeline in Figure 1. For ease, we make three simplifying assumptions. First, we
assume that c(0) = 0 so that consumers will incur zero current search costs in a period if they are
rested. Second, we assume that κ is positive but arbitrarily small.4 Third, we assume that the
4A condition like that in (2) could be calculated for the case of heterogeneous fatigue. Rather than express it
explicitly, any arbitrarily low value for κ will assure that we avoid the coordination problems that arise in joint
production problems.
14ﬁrms can distinguish  t-types when they visit their stores. As we discuss shortly, this assumption
is not necessary to derive a symmetric equilibrium, but makes our characterization easier. Indeed,
in Appendix B we consider an alternative model in which ﬁrms cannot detect types during visits.
Proposition 6. (Heterogeneous Fatigue) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic all-or-nothing
search game in which  t of the consumers search at any time t. Then, there exists an equilibrium
(ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t) where L = ¯ L and all ﬁrms set their prices according to a continuous, monotoni-
cally increasing, time-varying distribution function Ft(p) over the support [p∗
t, ¯ q]. The distribution
function is computed as
Ft(p) = 1 −
"










1− t + 1
. (11)
In equilibrium,  t =  0 for all even periods t ∈ {2,4,...} and is equal to 1 −  0 otherwise.
The lower bound p∗
t is monotonically decreasing in  t and n. The function Ft(p) is monotonically
increasing in  t and decreasing in n for all p. As n → ∞, p∗
t → 0 and Ft(p) → 0 for all p.
According to Proposition 6, the fraction  0 search during t = 1 and get the best deal in the
market. Their payoﬀ is ¯ q − pmin. The ﬁrms provide no assistance to searching customers and as
such they are fatigued after analyzing ¯ L products. Given their fatigue, they do not search at time
t = 2. In contrast, each consumer in the fraction 1 −  0 does not search and is randomly paired
with a ﬁrm. They each receive assistance and all purchase the special product from the ﬁrm that
they visit. Their payoﬀ is also almost surely positive and depends on their ﬁrm’s draw from F∗(p).
Since they do not search, however, they become rested at time t = 2 and search during that period.
Therefore, in each period the roles of the consumers switch. As such, there will be time-varying
price distributions that take values in one of two states, alternating each period depending on  0
and 1 −  0.
Not surprisingly, in each period, the ﬁrms play a mixed strategy equilibrium with regard to
prices. This result is consistent with previous all-or-nothing search models (e.g., Salop and Stiglitz,
151977; Varian, 1980) and price dispersion results from the impossibility of a pure strategy equilib-
rium. In this case, however, the distribution of prices varies over time due to the heterogeneous
and intermittent fatigue of the consumers. Only if  0 = 1
2 will Ft(p) be constant over time. As  0
departs from one-half will there be increasing variation across periods. In the extreme, when  0
is one, the ﬁrms will set prices as they did in Section 3.2.1, that is alternating between Bertrand
competition and monopoly prices. Therefore, Proposition 6 nests a result in Proposition 2 as a
special case when consumers are homogeneous.
According to our comparative statics results, with more ﬁrms (higher n), the lower bound of
the distribution decreases, consistent with more competition. However, F(p) also decreases, which
implies that ﬁrms tend to put more probability on setting higher prices. In the limit as n → ∞,
even though the lower bound converges to zero, the ﬁrms all choose pj = ¯ q almost surely. This
is not surprising since increasing competition makes it less likely to be the low-price ﬁrm in the
market. This eﬀect was ﬁrst described by Rosenthal (1980), that is the ability of competition to
induce rising prices.
Remark 4. The assumption that the ﬁrms observe which consumers are searching is not necessary
to derive an equilibrium in the spirit of Proposition 6. In Appendix B, we derive one in the case when
the ﬁrms share the burden of producing ¯ L products equally. Compared to the case in Proposition 6,
the lower bound of the support is lower, but Ft(p) is lower for all p. This change arises because
each ﬁrm can no longer direct non-searching searching consumers to the special product.
5.2 Brand Loyalty
So far in our analysis, we have made the somewhat unrealistic assumption that consumers (may)
switch products every period and start afresh. Now, we relax that assumption and suppose that
consumers can develop brand loyalty, either due to inertia, switching costs that are outside the
model, or relationships with someone at the ﬁrm.
Consider the same setup as Section 5.1 except that at any time t, a fraction 1−λt of consumers
have brand loyalty. We assume that 1 − λt is evenly distributed among the ﬁrms, so that no ﬁrm
has a brand advantage. Of the remaining λt fraction of consumers, a proportion  t are rested and
16search during period t. The remaining 1− t fraction of λt are each randomly paired with a ﬁrm.
Proposition 7. (Brand Loyalty) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic all-or-nothing search
game in which 1 − λt of the consumers have brand loyalty at any time t. Then, there exists an
equilibrium (ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t) where L = ¯ L and all ﬁrms set their prices according to
Ft(p) = 1 −
"





over the support [p∗





1−λt t + 1
. (13)
The lower bound p∗
t is monotonically decreasing in λt. The function Ft(p) is monotonically
decreasing in λt for all p.
Much of the structure of the equilibrium with brand loyalty is unchanged from the results in
Proposition 6. The fraction of searching consumers alternates in each period, the ﬁrms use a mixed
strategy when choosing prices, and ﬁrms help non-searching consumers (including those with brand
loyalty).
The distribution of prices is the only dimension that changes with brand loyalty. In periods of
high brand loyalty (low λ), the lower bound of the distribution is higher, but the ﬁrms place less
probability weight on high prices. When there is low brand loyalty, there is more competition for
searchers and p∗
t is lower. However, given a lower chance of being the low-priced ﬁrm, all ﬁrms
weight higher prices more within Ft(p). This implies that there is likely to be more price dispersion
in periods of low brand loyalty than when there is more brand loyalty.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how fatigue aﬀects consumer behavior and oligopoly outcomes. Our model
variations focus on one industry and generally we ﬁnd that fatigue induces product proliferation
and time-varying prices and consumer assistance.
Our analysis would apply equally well to a case in which a consumer searches for goods in
multiple industries. In the context of our model, as long as there is a probability that the consumer
17searches for an item in each industry in each period, ﬁrms should still ﬁnd it optimal to produce
multiple products, and prices (or price distributions) should be time varying. As such, we believe
that our model’s empirical predictions can be extended across industries as well, especially those
in which consumers search for related items (e.g., loans, investments, and insurance).
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20Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof proceeds by backward induction for each period. Denote the product oﬀering of the
monopolist by ℓ ≥ 1.
Suppose the consumer searches in period t and the consumer chooses the product with the
highest utility. To induce her to buy the special product, for any ℓ the monopolist optimally sets
prices p1 = ¯ q and pj > 0 for j  = 1 and earns a proﬁt of ¯ q. The consumer’s surplus is equal to
−c(xt−1) ≤ 0.
Suppose the consumer does not search in period t. The consumer is willing to buy the product
to which she was allocated as long as it oﬀers non-negative utility. For any ℓ > 1, the monopolist
optimally chooses a = 1 and sets prices p1 = ¯ q and pj > 0 for j  = 1. As such, its proﬁts are ¯ q and
the consumer earns zero surplus.
Thus, in every period the consumer prefers not to search for any ℓ. The monopolist maximizes





Given that only one product is produced, a = 0 for all t. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof proceeds by backward induction for each period. There are L products oﬀered in the
market and n special products.
Suppose the consumer searches in period t and the consumer selects the product with the highest
utility. Bertrand competition between the ﬁrms oﬀering identical products leads to pm
j = 0 for all
j and m. To show this, suppose that pm
j = 0 for all j and m, and that ﬁrm j deviates by setting
pm
j > 0 for any m. For m ≥ 2, the payoﬀ to the consumer from purchasing such a product from
ﬁrm j would be negative, which would lead to no sale. For m = 1, if p1
j > 0, the consumer would
purchase the special product from another ﬁrm. Therefore, increasing prices is not a proﬁtable
deviation. In this case, the consumer selects one of the special products from one of the n ﬁrms
and earns a surplus of ¯ q − c(xt−1). All ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts.
Suppose the consumer does not search in period t. The consumer is willing to buy the product
to which he was allocated as long as it oﬀers non-negative utility. If the consumer is randomly
allocated to ﬁrm j and ℓj > 1, the ﬁrm optimally chooses aj = 1. For any ℓj, each ﬁrm j optimally
sets prices p1 = ¯ q and pj > 0 for j  = 1 and its proﬁts are ¯ q. All other ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. Each
ﬁrm’s expected per period proﬁt is equal to
¯ q
n. The consumer earns zero surplus.
21Hence, the consumer searches in period t, if and only if ¯ q > c(xt−1). If the consumer did not
search in period t − 1 (i.e., xt−1 = 0), she searches in period t because c(0) < ¯ q. Let ¯ L be the
smallest integer such that ¯ q ≤ c(¯ L). If L < ¯ L, the consumer searches in every period and each ﬁrm
earns zero discounted expected proﬁts. If L ≥ ¯ L, the consumer searches in all odd number periods
(t = 1,t = 3,...) and does not search in all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...). In this case,





− (ℓj − 1)κ, (A2)
and the consumer’s expected discounted surplus is
U∗ =
¯ q
1 − δ2. (A3)
Suppose that in equilibrium all other n − 1 ﬁrms choose to produce a total of x < ¯ L products.
We now show that ﬁrm j prefers to produce ¯ L − x products to deter search in all even number
periods. The assumption in (2) assures this to be the case. Further, when the consumer searches
in odd-numbered periods, ﬁrm j has a strict incentive to set aj = 0 since c(¯ L − 1) < ¯ q.
Suppose that the total number of products oﬀered in the market is equal to ¯ L. If a particular
ﬁrm j produces ℓ∗
j +1 instead of ℓ∗
j products, it incurs an extra cost κ and thus reduces its expected
discounted proﬁts. Now, suppose that the ﬁrm only produces the special product. It avoids paying
(ℓ∗
j −1)κ in product line costs, but its (expected) per-period proﬁt drops to zero. Because (2) holds,
this is never a proﬁtable deviation.
Hence, there is a unique equilibrium number of products L = ¯ L. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3.
We prove our claim using an induction argument. The logic follows that in Diamond (1971). We
start by conjecturing that each ﬁrm only produces the special product and then show that this is
the case in equilibrium.
Suppose that in period t the consumer has already searched n − 1 ﬁrms and has received price
quotes from each of them. Deﬁne Pn−1 as the set of prices quoted to the consumer previously and
pn−1 as the minimum element of Pn−1. Suppose that the consumer has chosen to visit ﬁrm n. Firm
n’s optimal strategy is to set a price pn−1−ǫ and earn proﬁts of pn−1−ǫ. However, looking forward
and reasoning back, since ǫ < c(xt), the consumer will choose not to visit ﬁrm n.
Now consider the pricing behavior of the (n −1)th ﬁrm, given that the consumer has chosen to
search for a price from this ﬁrm. Deﬁne Pn−2 and pn−2 accordingly. It is optimal for pn−1 = pn−1−ǫ.
If the consumer stops searching, ﬁrm n − 1 earns pn−1 − ǫ. If the consumer continues searching,
ﬁrm n − 1 earns zero, but as we proved this will never happen. Therefore, looking forward and
22reasoning back, the consumer will not search the (n − 1)th ﬁrm because ǫ < c(xt). By induction,
the consumer arrives at the ﬁrst ﬁrm it samples and does not search further. As such, p1
j = ¯ q for
all j.
Now, we can prove our claim that ℓj = 1 for all j. Suppose that instead that ℓj > 1 for a
particular ﬁrm j. Suppose that the consumer visits this ﬁrm ﬁrst. The consumer will identify the
special product as the weakly optimal product to purchase. Indeed, as long as pm
j > 0 for m ≥ 2,
the consumer will not consider the alternatives. As such, all non-valuable products will not beneﬁt
for the ﬁrm. Now, suppose that the consumer visits another ﬁrm i  = j ﬁrst. By the previous
argument, the consumer will not choose to search further for a special product from another ﬁrm.
Certainly, the extra non-valuable products at other ﬁrms does not induce search. Therefore, making
ℓj > 1 is a dominated strategy.
Given this, ℓj = 1. In each period t, p1
j = ¯ q for all j, and st = 0. Consumer surplus is zero and






Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof proceeds by backward induction for each period. There are L products oﬀered in the
market and n special products.
Suppose the consumer searches in period t and the consumer selects the product with the highest
utility. Bertrand competition between the ﬁrms oﬀering identical products leads to pm
j = 0 for all
j and m. To show this, suppose that pm
j = 0 for all j and m, and that ﬁrm j deviates by setting
pm
j > 0 for any m. For m ≥ 2, the payoﬀ to the consumer from purchasing such a product from
ﬁrm j would be negative, which would lead to no sale. For m = 1, if p1
j > 0, the consumer would
purchase the special product from another ﬁrm. Therefore, increasing prices is not a proﬁtable
deviation. In this case, the consumer selects one of the special products from one of the n ﬁrms
and earns a surplus of ¯ q − c(xt−1). All ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts.
Suppose the consumer does not search in period t. The consumer is willing to buy the product
to which he was allocated as long as it oﬀers non-negative utility. If the consumer is randomly
allocated to ﬁrm j and ℓj > 1, the ﬁrm optimally chooses aj = 1. For any ℓj, each ﬁrm j optimally
sets prices p1 = ¯ q and pj > 0 for j  = 1 and its proﬁts are ¯ q. All other ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. Each
ﬁrm’s expected per period proﬁt is equal to
¯ q
n. The consumer earns zero surplus.
Hence, the consumer searches in period t, if and only if ¯ q > c(xt−1). If the consumer did not
search in period t − 1 (i.e., xt−1 = 0), she searches in period t because c(0) < ¯ q. Let ¯ L be the
smallest integer such that ¯ q ≤ c(¯ L). If L < ¯ L, the consumer searches in every period and each ﬁrm
23earns zero discounted expected proﬁts. If L ≥ ¯ L, the consumer searches in all odd number periods
(t = 1,t = 3,...) and does not search in all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...). In this case,





− (ℓj − 1)κ, (A5)
and the consumer’s expected discounted surplus is
U∗ =
¯ q
1 − δ2. (A6)
Each ﬁrm j optimally chooses ℓj = ¯ L. Producing ¯ L + 1 instead of ¯ L products incurs an extra
cost κ without any added beneﬁt. The ﬁrm will also not produce ℓj < ¯ L because (2) holds. Hence,
there is a unique equilibrium in which number of products in the market is L = n¯ L. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof proceeds by backward induction for each period. There are L products oﬀered in the
market and n special products.
Suppose the consumer searches in period t and the consumer selects the product with the highest
utility. Bertrand competition between the ﬁrms oﬀering identical products leads to pm
j = 0 for all
j and m. To show this, suppose that pm
j = 0 for all j and m, and that ﬁrm j deviates by setting
pm
j > 0 for any m. For m ≥ 2, the payoﬀ to the consumer from purchasing such a product from
ﬁrm j would be negative, which would lead to no sale. For m = 1, if p1
j > 0, the consumer would
purchase the special product from another ﬁrm. Therefore, increasing prices is not a proﬁtable
deviation. In this case, the consumer selects one of the special products from one of the n ﬁrms
and earns a surplus of ¯ q − c(xt−1). All ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts.
Suppose the consumer does not search in period t. The consumer is willing to buy the product
to which he was allocated as long as it oﬀers non-negative utility. If the consumer is randomly
allocated to ﬁrm j and ℓj > 1, the ﬁrm optimally chooses aj = 1. For any ℓj, each ﬁrm j optimally
sets prices p1 = ¯ q and pj > 0 for j  = 1 and its proﬁts are ¯ q. All other ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. Each
ﬁrm’s expected per period proﬁt is equal to
¯ q
n. The consumer earns zero surplus.
Hence, the consumer searches in period t, if and only if ¯ q > ct(xt−1). If the consumer did not
search in period t − 1 (i.e., xt−1 = 0), she searches in period t because ct(0) < ¯ q. Let ¯ Lt be the
smallest integer such that ¯ q ≤ ct(¯ Lt). If L < ¯ Lt, the consumer searches in every period and each
ﬁrm earns zero discounted expected proﬁts. If L ≥ ¯ Lt, the consumer searches in all odd number
periods (t = 1,t = 3,...) and does not search in all even number periods (t = 2,t = 4,...). In this






24and the consumer’s expected discounted surplus is
U∗ =
¯ q
1 − δ2. (A8)
Now, we can observe that it is a dominated strategy for any ﬁrm to choose ℓj > 1 and aj = 1
in even periods. Instead, each ﬁrm optimally chooses ℓj = 1 and aj = 0 to save the cost of κ per
extra product.
In each odd period, suppose that the n − 1 ﬁrms produce zt products. The optimal choice of
ℓj,t is ¯ Lt − zt. If it produces ¯ Lt − zt + 1 instead, it incurs an extra cost κ but does not enjoy any
beneﬁt for doing so. Now, suppose that the ﬁrm only produces the special product. It avoids paying
(¯ Lt −zt −1)κ in product line costs, but its (expected) per-period proﬁt drops to zero. Because (9)
holds, this is never a proﬁtable deviation.
Finally, when the consumer searches in odd-numbered periods, each ﬁrm j has a strict incentive
to set aj = 0 since ct(¯ Lt − 1) < ¯ q.
Hence, there is a unique equilibrium number of total products oﬀered in every odd period
L = ¯ Lt. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.
Outline of proof: The proof proceeds by backward induction. In each period, we ﬁrst consider con-
sumer buying behavior and the consumer assistance oﬀered by each ﬁrm conditional on identifying
which consumers are searching. Following that, we consider the ﬁrms’ pricing strategies. Working
backward, we then consider the search decision by consumers. Finally, we show the existence of an
equilibrium ℓ∗.
Step One: Buying behavior and consumer assistance
At any time t,  t-type consumers identify all products and prices in the market and choose the
one that gives the highest payoﬀ. By construction, xt = L, so that their next period search cost is
c(L). When a ﬁrm identiﬁes a searching consumer, it chooses aj = 0 as there is a cost to lowering
future search costs and no beneﬁt to giving assistance. At time t, (1 −  t)-type consumers are
randomly paired with a ﬁrm. In this case, the ﬁrm will oﬀer aj = 1 and direct the consumer to
the product that is most proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. As we will show shortly, in equilibrium this is the
special product.
Step Two: Pricing
First let us consider the price of the special product and assume that the ﬁrm always directs (1− t)-
types to this product. Eventually, we will show that this is indeed always optimal in equilibrium.
25Deﬁne J∗ as the set of ﬁrms who quote the lowest price for the special product and nj∗ as the
number of ﬁrms in J∗. Then, the payoﬀ function for each ﬁrm j ∈ N is
max
pj∈[0,¯ q]
πj(pj) = pjQj, (A9)





1 −  
n
,
Given this, the payoﬀ to each ﬁrm is continuous, except when its price is the lowest and equal to
at least one of its competitors.
We prove existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium by appealing to Theorem 5 in
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Using their notation, let Aj = [0, ¯ q] be the action space for ﬁrm j
and let aj ∈ Aj be a price in that space. As such, Aj is non-empty, compact, and convex for all
j. Deﬁne A = ×j∈N Aj and a = (a1,...,an). Let Uj : A → R be deﬁned as the proﬁt function in
(A9). Deﬁne the set A∗(j) by
A∗(j) = {(a1,...,an) ∈ A|∃i  = j s.t. pj = pi}
and the set A∗∗(j) ⊆ A∗(j) by
A∗∗(j) = {(a1,...,an) ∈ A|∃i  = j s.t. pj = pi = pmin > 0}.
As such, the payoﬀ function Uj is bounded and continuous, except over points ¯ a ∈ A∗∗(j). The sum
P
j∈N Uj(a) is continuous since discontinuous shifts in demand from informed consumers between
ﬁrms at points in A∗∗ = ×j∈N A∗∗(j) occur as transfers between ﬁrms who have the same low
price in the industry. Finally, it is straightforward to show that Uj(aj,a−j) is weakly lower semi-
continuous. Since any time pi = pj = pmin, ﬁrm i and j share the demand, there exists a λ ∈ [0,1]
large enough such that
λ[(pj − ǫ)  +
(pj − ǫ)(1 −  )
n
] + (1 − λ)






pj(1 −  )
n
], (A10)





which is true for all λ > 0. Therefore by Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), there exists a
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for this subgame, conditional on the ﬁrms always directing
non-searching consumers to the special product.
Now, we can prove properties about F∗(p), again conditional on the ﬁrm always directing consumers
to the special product.
26i. Continuity: Suppose that there did exist a countable number of mass points in the distribution
of F∗(p). Then, we can ﬁnd a mass point p′ and an ǫ > 0 such that f∗(p′) = a > 0 and
f∗(p′ − ǫ) = 0. Now consider a deviation by ﬁrm j to choose ˆ F(p) such that ˆ f(p′) = 0 and
ˆ f(p′ − ǫ) = a. Since E[πj(p)] using F∗(p) is strictly less than using ˆ F(p), this would be a
proﬁtable deviation. Therefore, in equilibrium, no mass points can exist.
ii. Strict monotonicity (Increasing): Suppose there exists an interval [pa,pb] within [0, ¯ q] such
that F(pb)−F(pa) = 0. Then, for any ˆ p such that pa < ˆ p < pb, [1−F(ˆ p)]n−1 = [1−F(pa)]n−1.
Since ˆ p[1 − F(ˆ p)]n−1 > pa[1 − F(pa)]n−1 and ˆ p[1 − (1 − F(ˆ p))n−1] > pa[1 − (1 − F(pa))n−1],
then there exists a proﬁtable deviation. Thus, F(pb) − F(pa)  = 0 for any interval [pa,pb]
within [0, ¯ q].
Given continuity and strict monotonicity, we can write the symmetric F(p) explicitly. For any
price p that a ﬁrm may choose,
πj(p) = p [1 − F(p)]n−1 +
p(1 −  )
n
. (A12)
Since each ﬁrm needs to be indiﬀerent between setting an price over a support [p∗, ¯ q], we can write
p [1 − F(p)]n−1 +
p(1 −  )
n
=
¯ q(1 −  )
n
. (A13)
Rearranging yields the expression in (10). We can then solve
p∗  +
p∗(1 −  )
n
=
¯ q(1 −  )
n
(A14)
for p∗, which yields (11). Finally, inspecting (11), it is clear that p∗ > 0 for any   < 1. Therefore,
the ﬁrms will always direct non-searching consumers to the special product since they don’t make
positive proﬁts by selling alternative products.





















27Step Three: Consumer Search Decision
It is straightforward that in each period, any consumer with xt−1 = 0 will search, since c(0) = 0.
For the consumers with xt−1 > 0, they will search if and only if
¯ q − E[pmin|F(p)] > c(xt−1). (A15)
Step Four: Firms Choice of Product Lines
Given that c( ) is strictly increasing in its argument, there exists an ¯ L such that ¯ q−E[pmin|F(p)] <
c(¯ L), so the consumer does not search. With the condition (2), proving that any ℓ∗ that induces
L = ¯ L follows the same logic as in Proposition 2. Given this,  t =  0 for all even periods
t ∈ {2,4,...} and is equal to 1 −  0 otherwise. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7.
The proof follows with the exact same logic as the Proof of Proposition 6. The only diﬀerence
is the computation of Ft(p).
In any period t, for any price p that a ﬁrm may choose,
πj(p) = p λt[1 − Ft(p)]n−1 +






Since each ﬁrm needs to be indiﬀerent between setting an price over a support [p∗, ¯ q], we can write
p λ[1 − Ft(p)]n−1 +






¯ q(1 −  )
n
+
¯ q(1 − λt)
n
. (A17)
Rearranging yields the expression in (12). We can then solve
p∗  +






¯ q(1 −  )
n
+
¯ q(1 − λt)
n
(A18)
for p∗, which yields (13).
The comparative statics regarding λt in Proposition 7 are derived by straightforward diﬀeren-
tiation. ￿
28Appendix B
B.1 Heterogeneous Fatigue: Fatigue Private Knowledge
Consider the setup in Section 5.1, except that the ﬁrms can distinguish  t-types when they visit their
stores and ﬁrms share the burden of L∗ in equilibrium when one exists. This latter assumption
is not necessary for an equilibrium to exist, but makes characterization easier. Otherwise, the
equilibrium may involve asymmetry in mixed strategies.
Proposition B1. (Heterogeneous Fatigue) Suppose that n ﬁrms compete in a dynamic all-or-
nothing search game in which  t of the consumers search at any time t. Then, there exists an
equilibrium (ℓ∗,F∗
t (p),a∗
t) where L = L∗ and all ﬁrms set their prices according to a continuous,
monotonically increasing, time-varying distribution function Ft(p) over the support [p∗
t, ¯ q]. The
distribution function is computed as
Ft(p) = 1 −
"










1− t + 1
. (B20)
In equilibrium,  t =  0 for all even periods t ∈ {2,4,...} and is equal to 1 −  0 otherwise.
The lower bound p∗
t is monotonically decreasing in L and the function Ft(p) is monotonically
increasing in L for all p.
Proof:
The proof follows with the exact same logic as the Proof of Proposition 6. The only diﬀerence
is the computation of Ft(p).
In any period t, for any price p that a ﬁrm may choose,
πj(p) = p [1 − F(p)]n−1 +




= p [1 − F(p)]n−1 +






Since each ﬁrm needs to be indiﬀerent between setting an price over a support [p∗, ¯ q], we can write
p [1 − F(p)]n−1 +
p(1 −  )
L
=
¯ q(1 −  )
L
. (B22)
Rearranging yields the expression in (B19). We can then solve
p∗  +
p∗(1 −  )
L
=
¯ q(1 −  )
L
(B23)
for p∗, which yields (B20).
The comparative statics regarding L in Proposition B1 are derived by straightforward diﬀeren-
tiation. ￿
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